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Articles
THE PROBLEM OF THE INTIMIDATED WITNESS: THE NEED TO SHORE

Up THE

NANCE DOCTRINE REGARDING THE ADMISSION OF PRIOR STATEMENTS

by Lynn McLain, Esq.
a. The Problem

On March 15,2000, three defendants were acquitted
at the close oftheir trial for the murder of Shawn Suggs. I
The defendants "slapped hands in exultation."2
There had been serious problems with the State's
case. Among these was that the State's key witness
recanted her prior statement inculpating the defendants.
The victim's mother was quoted in the newspaper as saying
that the witness was scared of being murdered, and the
mother didn't blame her.3 After all, another State's witness
had been murdered. 4 A third, who had been "kept in
protective custody for three years while the case waited
for trial, [had] disappeared."s
When the preliminary draft ofTitle 5 ofthe Maryland
Ru1es was being prepared by the Evidence Subcommittee
ofthe Court of Appeals' Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Judge John Prevas ofthe Circuit
Court of Baltimore City testified that the problem of
recanting witnesses is a formidable obstacle to the pursuit
of justice. He stated that the witnesses cooperate
immediately after they see a serious crime, but by the time
of trial, they all too often have been threatened by the
accused's family or friends or the witnesses have been
persuaded, in some way, that they wou1d be safer if they
did not "get involved. ''6

Under traditional common law rules, followed in
Maryland until 1993, a witness's prior inconsistent
statements were admissible for impeachment purposes
only and not as substantive evidence (unless of course,
they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted7 or they fell within a recognized hearsay
exception). 8
b. Response in Nance

In Nance v. State,9 trial Judge David B. Mitchell
took a bold step. In their trial testimony, three principal
State's witnesses lo denied all relevant knowledge of the
crime - a drug turf related murder. This testimony was at
complete odds with their grand jury testimony and the
pretrial signed, written statements that they had made to
the police. One of the witnesses also had given a signed
statement to police and to an assistant State's attorney
that he had been contacted by a friend of one of the
defendants and taken to the office of that defendant's
lawyer, to whom he said that he wouldnot testify against
the defendants. I I Another gave a signed written statement
ofwamings he had received from that defendant and
another. 12 When questioned at trial, the witnesses
"remembered some parts of these earlier events, did not
remember others, and outright denied or repudiated other
parts. Their lapses of memory conspicuously occurred

ICaitlin Francke, Three Freed Again in '95 Slaying, THE BALTIMORE SUN,
Mar. 16, 2000, at A I.

7See LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL §§ 801.5.11 (\ 987 & Supp. \995).

21d.

RSee id. Parts 801(4), 801(5), and 803-804(5).

3Tim Craig, Murder Trial Key Witness Withdraws I.D. o[Suspects, THE
BALTIMORE SUN, MAR. 9, 2000, AT B18.

9331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993).

4Francke, supra note I, at 6A, col. 3.

If'They were recalled as court's witnesses after they had recanted at trial.
This step would no longer be necessary today, because of the adoption
of Md. Rule 5-607.

'Id.

11331 Md. at 555,629 A.2d at 636.
6Notes from a Special Reporter for the Evidence Subcommittee and the
Rules Committee (May 31, 1991)(on file with author).

l2See id. at 556, 629 A.2d at 636.
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whenever the questions at trial approached matters
potentially implicating Nance and [a co-defendant] in the
murder."13 Absent the substantive use of the witnesses'
prior statements, a judgment for acquittal would have had
to be granted, as there was no other evidence identifying
the defendants as the guilty parties.
Breaking with traditional Maryland case law, Judge
Mitchell found the prior statements reliable and admitted
them as substantive evidence. In 1993, the court of
appeals, in a scholarly opinion by Judge McAuliffe for a
unanimous court, affinned that both ofthe witnesses' prior
inconsistent statements, (1) their grand jury testimony, and
(2) written statements, based on the witnesses' fIrst-hand
knowledge, which were signed or otherwise adopted by
them, had been properly permitted to be admitted as
substantive evidence, since the witnesses were present at
trial and thus subject to cross-examination. 14
Judge McAuliffe quoted Judge Learned Hand's
comments that, when a witness denies earlier statements,
it "may be highly probative to observe the mark and
manner of his denial. ... "15 The jury will evaluate the
evidence, "from what they see and hear of that person in
COurt."16

c. Codification of Nance
In 1994, Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (a) codifIed and
expanded the court ofappeals's decision in Nance. Under
the Rule, the following types ofprior inconsistent statements
of a declarant who testifIes at trial and is subject to cross-

131d. at 556-58, 572, 629 A.2d at 636-37,644-45.
14See id. at 331 Md. 549, 569, 629 A.2d at 643 (1993). Accord Stewart
v. State, 104 Md. App. 273, 655 A.2d 1345 (1995) (trial court properly
admitted "turncoat witness's" signed statement and grand jUl)' testimony;
state need not show surprise; Sheppard v. State, 102 Md. App. 571,
650 A.2d 1362 (1994) (reversible error to admit State's witnesses prior
inconsistent signed written statements, made to public defender's
investigator, as impeachment evidence only, when defense offered them
as substantive evidence). But cf Bradley v. State, 333 Md. 593, 607, 636
A.2d 999, 1006 (1994) (Nance inapplicable when witness had not signed
statement to police; detective only made notes of interview).
15

331 Md. at 566, 629 A.2d at 641.

161d.
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examinationl ? concerning the prior statement are admissible
as substantive evidence:
(1) statements put in writing (not necessarily by the
declarant) and then signed (or otherwise adopted) by the
declarant; I g
(2) statements made under oath in a formal
proceeding, such as a grand jury proceeding, deposition,
or trial; 19 and
(3) statements stenographically or electronically
recorded. 20
17The stem of Mo.RuLE 5-802.1 provides:
The following statements previously made by a witness who testifies at
the trial or hearing and who is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement are not excluded by the hearsay rule ....
18See e.g., Pefl)' v. State, 344 Md. 204, 242-43, 686 A.2d 274, 293
(1996); Stewart v. State, 342 Md. 230,674 A.2d 944 (1996) (signed
statement on the back of a photo array card); Parker v. State, 129 Md.
App. 360,400-01,742 A.2d 28,50 (1997); Thomas v. State, 113 Md.
App. 1,4-5,686 A.2d 676 (1996) (signed, written statement properly
admitted); Makell v. State, 104 Md. App. 334, 656 A.2d 348 (1995).
MD. RULE 5-802.1 (a)(2) permits the substantive use of: "[a]
statement that is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, if the
statement was ... (2) reduced to writing and signed by the declarant ..
. ," when the requirements of the stem of MD. RULE 5-802.1 are met.
Subsection (a)(2)' s restriction to only signed statements was a deliberate
rejection of the Hawaii rule's extension to written statements that are
"signed or otherwise adopted or approved." Stewart v. State, 342 Md.
230,237 n.2, 674 A.2d 944,948 n.2 (1996). But even a signed statement
"might not be admissible if the circumstances suggest that the declarant
did not clearly intend to adopt it by signing." ld. at 238 n.3, 674 A.2d at
948 n.3.
19See e.g., Stewart v. State, 342 Md. 230, 674 A.2d 944 (1996) (grand
jUl)' testimony); Makell y. State, 104 Md. App. 334, 656 A.2d 348
(1995). Md. Rule 5-802.I(a)(I) permits the substantive use of: "[a]
statement that is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, if the
statement was (I) given under oath subject to the penalty ofperjul)' at
a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition ... ," when the
requirements of the stem of MD. RULE 5-802.1 are met.
2°Md. Rule 5-802. I (a)(3) provides: "[a] statement that is inconsistent
with the declarant's testimony, if the statement was ... (3) recorded in
substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or electronic means
contemporaneously with the making of the statement .... " See
Dumornay v. State, 106 Md. App. 361, 664 A.2d 469 (1995) (no error
in admitting, under Nance, prior inconsistent statements that were taperecorded).
In adopting subsection (a)(3), the court of appeals used
"stenographic" to mean contemporaneously preserved by a reliable
stenographer, not, e.g., any police officer's "shorthand." Notes of
November 18, 1993, open hearing, on file with author.
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Under the pre-Maryland Rule 5-607 common law
voucher rule, the party calling the witness could not impeach
the witness by prior inconsistent statement, unless both
surprised and affirmatively damaged by the witness's
testimony. No such surprise need be shown in order to
introduce a statement under Rule 5-802.1 (a), because it
is offered not to impeach, but as reliable, substantive
evidence.21
d. Erosion of the Nance Policy in Tyler
In Tyler v. State,22 the evidence established that either
Tyler or the declarant, who were seated together in a car,

Some other states' codifications, like Maryland's, have dropped
the requirement that the prior inconsistent statement be under oath.
ARIZ.R.EvID. 801(d)(I)(A); DEL.UNIF.R.EvID. 801(d)(I)(A);
MONT.R.EvID. 801 (d)( I)(A). HAWAII R.EvID. 802.1 (I) provides for the
admission of prior inconsistent statements which either were made under
oath in a proceeding or in a deposition; or were "[r]educed to writing and
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the declarant;" or were
"[r]ecorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic, mechanical,
electrical, or other means ...." PUERTO RICO R.EvID. 63 classifies all
prior statements of a witness, both consistent and inconsistent, as falling
within a hearsay exception. See also Graham, Proposed Amendments to
Rules BOI(d)(l)(A) and 613(b), in ABA, Litigation Section, Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence 53-66 (1985) (Graham
proposes broadening FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1 )(A) to be more similar to
the Hawaii rule and to read as follows: "A statement is not hearsay if
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and [t]he statement is
inconsistent with his testimony, and (i) is proved to have been made
under oath subject to penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other
proceeding or in a deposition, or (ii) is made by a declarant having
personal knowledge ofthe underlying event or condition the statement
narrates, describes, or explains and (l) the statement is proved to have
been written or signed by the declarant, or (2) the making ofthe statement
is acknowledged to have been made either (a) by the declarant in his
testimony in the present proceeding or (b) by the declarant under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a prior trial, hearing or other proceeding
or in a deposition, or (3) the statement is proved to have been accurately
recorded by a tape recorder, videotape recorder, or any other similar
electronic means of sound recording ...."); Note, Substantive Admissibility
of a Non-Party Witness' Prior Inconsistent Statements: Pennsylvania
Adopts the Modern View, 32 VILL. L. REv. 471 (1987).
21 Stewart v. State, 342 Md. 230,674 A.2d 944 (1996).
22342 Md. 766, 679 A.2d 1127 (1996), rev'g 105 Md. App. 495, 660
A.2d 986 ( 1995) (en banc).

had shot the victim (Len Bias's brother, Jay). Thedeclarant
had given sworn testimony, at his own trial for the murder,
that his cohort, Tyler, had killed the victim. But when asked
about the shooting at Tyler's subsequent trial, the declarant
repeatedly stated only "I can't answer that question,"
despite the court's order to answer.23 The witness's
attorney had informed the court that someone in a brown
car had followed the witness and struck his car the night
before he was to appear at Tyler's trial and that the witness
felt he was "in great danger ifhe testifie[d] in this case."24
The court ofappeals, in an opinion authored by Judge
Chasanow, became stymied by the analytical problem of
whether the assertion, "I can't answer that question," was
inconsistent with the earlier testimony. The witness did
not say, for example, "I fired the shots," or "I never saw
anything," both of which clearly would have been
inconsistent with his earlier testimony . What he said was,
in this author's opinion, and in accordance with the thrust
of now Chief Judge, then Judge Joseph Murphy's
concurrence in the Court of Special Appeals' decision
affinning Tyler's conviction,25 more akin to saying, "I have
no memory now." Several federal courts have treated a
witness's testimony to lack of present memory as
"inconsistent" with prior statements in which the witness
had purported to have memory.26
The court of appeals held that the witness simply
had refused to testify at Tyler's trial, and therefore not
only had not "testified" inconsistently with his prior
testimony at his own trial, but was not "subj ect to crossexamination" concerning that prior testimony. 27

though the declarant's refusal to testify made him "unavailable" for
purposes of Rule 5-804(a), Tyler had had no opportunity to crossexamine at the declarant's trial. See MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 7,
§ 804(1).1.
2JSee 342 Md. at 771-72,679 A.2d at 1130.
24 105 Md. App. at 508,660 A.2d at 992-93.
2lTyler v. State, 105 Md. App. 495,565,660 A.2d 986, 1020 (en banc)
(Murphy, J., concurring), reversed, 342 Md. 766, 679 A.2d 1127 (1996).
See Comment, The Forgetful Witness, 60 U. CHI. L.REv. 167 (1993).
26See infra note 46.

The prior testimony did not fall under the hearsay exception for
prior testimony, now codified at MD. RULE 5-804(b)(l), because, even

27342 Md. at 776-79, 679 A.2d at 1132-33.
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Unfortunately, that conclusion permits the easy
circumvention - by a witness's repeating the mantra "I
can't answer that question" (instead of, as in Nance, "I
don't remember") - of the policy behind Nance and
Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (a): the unwillingness to let a
recalcitrant or threatened witness's failure to testify at trial
thwart justice. In an attempt to curtail the undesirable
effects of the court of appeals's decision in Tyler - with
1x>th possibly guilty parties not being convicted, even though
the facts were clear that one of them was the shooterthe court, therefore, took pains to caution strongly against
severance of the trials of co-perpetrators. 28
e. Corbett and the Further Multiplication of
Divergent Paths
In Corbett v. State,29 the Court of Special Appeals
further contributed to the undennining ofthe policy behind
Nance and Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (a), as well as Maryland
Rule 5-104(a). The Corbett trial court had admitted,
under Rule 5-802.1 (a), a twelve-year-old alleged sexual
abuse victim's written and signed statement, made to the
police, when at trial she testified to some ofthe surrounding
events and to her making the statement, but stated that at
trial she "could not remember" the abusive incident itself.
A panel ofthe court ofspecial appeals, in a well-researched
opinion by Judge Byrnes, found this to be reversible error.
The appellate court held that the prior statement would
be "inconsistent" with the witness's trial testimony only if
the trial court had found, under Rule 5-1 04(a), that the
witness did remember, but was being evasive. The court
of special appeals held, on the other hand, that the prior
statement could not come in under Rule 5-802.1 (a) ifthe
trial judge believed that the witness really could not
remember. The appellate court held that the trial court
had erroneously admitted the prior statement, absent an
explicit fmding on this question, under Rule 5-1 04(a).

Interestingly, the Corbett decision is contrary to the
opinion of another panel ofthe court ofspecial appeals in
Makell v. State,30 where, in a thorough and thoughtful
opinion authored by Judge Moylan, the court of special
appeals held that total loss of memory does not make the
statement inadmissible, nor does it make the witness
unavailable for cross-examination.
The distinction between feigned and real memory loss
is not without support, however, in some ofthe lower
federal courts' case law, which is widely divergent on this
controversial issue. 31 But it seems to make no practical
difference to the character or quantum o/the witness's
trial testimony, whether the witness now is lying when
she says she cannot remember (only then is the prior
statement admissible under Corbett), the witness is telling
the truth when she says she cannot remember (then the
prior statement is inadmissible under Corbett), the witness
testifies that she "can't answer that question" (then the
prior statement is inadmissible under Tyler), or the witness
testifies "I didn't see anything" (then the prior statement is
admissible under Nance).
These are differences without distinction to the factfinder. In each of these situations, the witness's trial
statements are inconsistent with his or her prior statements
in which, as ChiefJudge Murphy has explained, the witness
implicitly said "I can answer,"32 or "I do remember."
f. The Confrontation Clause: The Heart of the
Matter
The gravamen of the question seems more to be
whether the witness is "subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement," as required by Rule 5-802.1 (a).
The witness is at trial and the fact-finder can see the
witness's demeanor.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in affinning a conviction based in part on the grand
jury testimony ofa witness who, at trial, denied knowledge

28See id. at 769-70 n.2, 679 A.2d at 1129 n.2. See, e.g., Conyersv. State,

311104 Md. App. 334,656 A.2d 348 (1995).

345 Md. 525, 546-56, 693 A.2d 781, 791-96 (1997) (no abuse of
discretion in denial of motion to sever).

31See infra notes 36-40 and 46 and accompanying text.

29No. 755 (Md. App. Mar. 1,2000) (at the time of this writing, the time
for filing a petition for certiorari has not expired).

32Tyler v. State, 105 Md. App. 495, 565, 660 A.2d 986, 1030 (Murphy,
J., concurring), rev'd, 342 Md. 766, 679 A.2d 1127 (1996).
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of the relevant facts, has pointed out th~ value to the factfinder of seeing the witness at trial, and seeing the witness
cross-examined, even ifhe did not testify to any relevant
fact:
In this case, ofcourse, Robinson [the
witness] did appear on the witness stand.
Indeed, the defendants complain that this
prejudiced their cases in the minds of
the jurors, but the judge ordered the initial
examination ofRobinson in the presence
of the jury in order that the jury would
not be left with speculation about the
reason for Robinson's absence,
speculation which might have suggested
inferences more hurtful to the defendants
than Robinson's refusal to testify. He
was presented for cross-examination
only after Robinson had stated in an in
camera hearing that he might answer the
questions of defense counsel, and that
he could not tell whether he would
respond until they asked the questions.
Though, as we have indicated earlier,
the jurors may have taken Robinson's
earlier disclaimers of knowledge as
equivalent to a later explicit refusal
to testify, they also may have received
such disclaimers, with Robinson's
statement that his grand jury
testimony was inaccurate, as
exculpatory. In any event, the jury
saw and heard Robinson on the
witness stand. What they saw and
heard may have been of substantial
assistance to the jury in assessing the
truthfulness of his grand jury
testimony.33
In finding the admission of evidence constitutional,
the Fourth Circuit relied on the fact that corroborating

33United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1146 (4th Cir. 1978).

evidence proved the reliability of Robinson' s prior grand
jury testimony.34 That avenue subsequently has been
foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Idaho v. Wright,35 which held that the presence or
absence ofcorroborating evidence is irrelevant to whether
an out-of-court statement is sufficiently reliable to survive
a confrontation clause challenge, and is relevant only to
whether an error in admission was harmless or reversible.
But, in 1988, the United States Supreme Court, in
United States v. Owens,36 held that a witness who
presently had no memory ofthe subject matter ofthe prior
statement is nonetheless "subject to cross" at the trial. The
Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, rejected
the argument that the confrontation clause required a
distinction between a witness who feigned memory loss
and a witness who really had memory loss.37 After all,
"the witness' assertion of memory loss - which ... is
often the very result sought to be produced by crossexamination, ... can be effective in destroying the force
of the prior statement."38
34See id. ("We do not hold, however, that this cross-examination under
these difficult circumstances was adequate to meet the requirements of
the Confrontation Clause. It is enough that the grand jury testimony
was admissible because of its strong corroboration by the testimony of
Miss McKee and the undeniable records.") (citations omitted).
31497 U.S. 805 (1990). See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547,636
A.2d 463 (1994) (reversible error to admit declaration against penal
interest - signed confession made during police interrogation - of
defendant's cohort, who refused to testify; although "necessity"
requirement of Ohio v. Roberts was met, State failed to meet its burden
of showing particularized guarantees of trustworthiness ofthe statement,
which did not fall within a "firmly rooted" exception; declarant had
admitted to playing only a minor role in the offense and shifted major
blame to others; Idaho v. Wright forbade consideration of corroborating
evidence on question of trustworthiness, although corroborating evidence
may be considered as to whether error was harmless).
36 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
37See id. See, e.g., United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir.
1985); Van Hatten v. State, 666 P.2d 1047 (Alaska App. 1983)(feigning
witness is still "subject to cross-examination").

33Id. at 562. Accord Makel\ v. State, 104 Md. App. 334, 656 A.2d 348
(1995) (even if the witness has total memory loss, the witness is still
"subject to cross-examination"). But see Corbett v. State, No. 755 (Md.
App. Mar. I , 2000), supra at note 29 and accompanying text.
The making of a statement qualifying under Md. Rule 5-802.I(a)
need not be proved by the declarant's trial testimony. See Makell v.

30.1 U. Bait. L.F. 9
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The Owens majority held that an assault victim's prior
identification of the defendant as his attacker was
admissible under Federal Rule ofEvidence 801 (d)(l )(C),
as he was "subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement,"39 when he testified at trial that he remembered
making the statement to an FBI agent but had no present
recollection ofthe identity of his attacker and was unable
to explain the basis for the identification. The victim's
memory loss was a result of severe head injuries caused
by the beating at issue. The Court also held that the
confrontation clause was not violated. The opportunity to
cross-examine suffices. 40 (A different situation arises if
the witness is called to the stand at the trial but refuses to
testify by invoking a privilege. )41
Indeed, in apparent recognition of Owens, the court
of special appeals in Corbett states that "the parties do
not dispute that [the witness] was present at trial and
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement. "42
Yet the Corbett court requires the result as to admissibility
to turn on the very distinction that Owens had rejected.
Moreover, despite the fact that the record provided
sufficient indicia to support a reasonable inference that the
child was feigning memory loss because she was reluctant
to testify, the appellate court reversed and remanded,
because the trial judge had not made such a finding on the

State, 104 Md. App. 334, 656 A.2d 348 (1995). See also McCray v.
State, 122 Md. App. 598, 613, 716 A.2d 302, 309 (1998).
39 484 U.S. at 561.
411See id at 557-61 (noting, inter alia, that the advisory committee note to

FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3), which defines a witness testifying to a loss of
memory as unavailable, states that FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3) "clearly
contemplates his production and subjection to cross-examination").

record. Maryland Rule 5-1 04(a) does not, on its face,
require that trial judges make every preliminary factual
finding on the record. To impose such a requirement would
be needlessly to build in a torrent ofreversible error, even
when the record suffices to support an implicit finding by
the trial court.
g. Comparison of Corbett with the Lower Federal
Courts' Approach
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(l)(A),43 although
narrower than Maryland Rule 5-802. 1(a) in scope (in
federal court, the prior inconsistent statement must have
been under oath, in a formal proceeding),44 has the same
threshold requirements: that the declarant testify at trial

43FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(I)(A) provides that "[a] statement is not hearsay
if - The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to crossexamination concerning the statement, and the statement is inconsistent
with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition
.... " See generally 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 251 at 117-21 (John W.
Strong, ed.) (5th ed. 1999); Blakey, Substantive Use o/Prior Inconsistent
Statements Under the Federal Rules o/Evidence, 64 Ky. L.J. 3 (1974);
Graham, Examination o/One 's Own Witness Under the Federal Rules 0/
Evidence, 54 TEX. L. REv. 917, 966-72 (1976); Silbert, Federal Rule 0/
Evidence 801 (d)(\ )(A), 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 880 (\ 976); Stuesser, Admitting
Prior Inconsistent Statements/or Their Truth, 71 CANADIAN B.REv. 18
(1992) (recommending that Canadian law be changed to give trial judge
discretion to admit seemingly reliable, necessary statements as
substantive evidence); Comment, Extrinsic Evidence o/Prior Inconsistent
Statements: Pennsylvania and the Judicial Discretion Foundational Rule,
79 DICK. L. REv. 444 (1975); Comment, Impeachment by Inconsistent
Statements: California Theory and Practice, 9 U.C.D. L. REv. 285, 308-

09 (1976); 39 MD. L. REv. 472 (1975).
"See United States v. Livingston, 661 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir.1981) (reversible

4lSee United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. at 561-62; United States v.

Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999) (confrontation right
precludes admission of prior grand jury testimony under FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(\)(A), even when witness repeatedly invokes an unavailable
privilege); WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 80 I. \0 [2][a] & [b][iii] at
801-17-19 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed.) (2d ed. 1999) (prior inconsistent
statement cannot be used if a privilege is successfully invoked but may
be used if witness lacks memory). Cf Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(\ 965) (when declarant of out-of-court confession invoked selfincrimination privilege and was thus unavailable for cross-examination,
defendant's right to confront was violated by admission of confession).
42Corbett v. State, No. 755, slip op. at I3(Md. App. Mar. 1,2000).
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error to admit as substantive evidence sworn statement given to postal
inspectors); United States v. Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.
1977) (unsworn statement made to FBI agent); Martin v. United States,
528 F.2d 1157, 1161 (4th Cir.1975) (sworn and unsworn statements
before two investigating officers). But see United States v. CastroAyon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.) (tape recorded immigration interrogation
before federal agent qualifies as "proceeding" under Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(I)(A», cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983, 97 S.Ct. 501, 50 L.Ed.2d 594
(1976); State v. Smith, 97 Wash.2d 856, 651 P.2d 207 (\982)(affidavit
in witness-victim's own words, made at station house and attested to
before a notary, qualified). See WEINSTEIN, supra note 41, § 801.1 0[2][ d]
at 801-19-21 (federal rule should be interpreted to require "some kind of
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding").
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and be subject to cross-examination concerning the prior
statement. 45
United States v. Owens dispensed with the need to
distinguish between feigned and real memory loss for
confrontation clause purposes. Under the lower federal
courts' rulings, the trial court, in its discretion, may
determine that a particular witness's claimed lack of
memory is sufficiently inconsistent with a prior statement
to permit admission. 46
h. Other Alternatives Pursued in the Federal System

But it is important to recognize that, in the federal
system, the problem of the recanting witness has been
addressed in two additional ways. First, several courts,
including the United States Court ofAppeals for the Fourth
Circuit, have applied Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5)
[now Federal Rule of Evidence 807], the hearsay residual

exception, to admit reliable prior grand jury testimony of
the now uncooperative or unavailable witness. 47
Maryland's inhospitable decision in State V.
Walker,48 however, seems to make it unlikely that the Court
ofAppeals ofMaryland would permit such evidence under
. Mary land's corollary rule, Rule 5-804(b)(5).
Second, under the new provision found in Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), an accused waives his or her
confrontation right by procuring the absence or silence of
a witness.49 The Rules Committee should evaluate whether
to propose the adoption of a similar rule in Mary land.
i. Conclusion

Maryland's courts must not lose sight ofthe policy
determinations faced squarely in Nance. Shoring up the
Nance doctrine, by rejecting the distinction drawn by the
court of special appeals in Corbett and retreating from

47See e.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982) (at
first trial, witness testified he did not remember; at second, the witness
refused to be sworn).

4SFED. R. EVID. 801(d)(I)(A), (B) and (C).

4R345 Md. 293, 691 A.2d 1341 (1997).

6
4 See, e.g.,

49FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) provides: "(b) Hearsay exceptions. The
following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness: ... (5) Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A statement
offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that
was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability ofthe declarant as a
witness." Cf United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir.1971)(a
pre-Federal Rules of Evidence case, finding reversible error in admission
of recalcitrant witness's grand jury testimony; although witness took
the stand at trial, he refused to be sworn, but did make answers such as
'''I don't recall"').

United States v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir. 1997);
United States V. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 46-47 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (grand jury
testimony of witness who at trial testified to lack of memory was admitted
properly under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(I)(A) as a prior inconsistent
statement), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 919, rehearing denied, 513 U.S. 1067
(1994); United States V. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 958 (6th Cir.1981) (no
abuse of discretion to admit witnesses' grand jury testimony as
substantive evidence, when witnesses had only partial or vague
recollection; no error to admit parts that corroborated in-court testimony,
when "the prior statements are predominantly inconsistent with the incourt statements, and the corroborative portions are needed to set the
whole in context;" in addition, much of grand jury testimony was
admissible under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1 )(C), which has no inconsistency
requirement), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); United States V.
Marchand, 564 F.2d 983,998-99 (2d Cir. 1977) (witness forgetting or
denying facts to which he or she testified before grand jury will be
sufficient inconsistency), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978). But see
United States V. Devine, 934 F.2d 1325, 1344-45 (5th Cir.1991) (on
facts of the case, witness's claim offaulty memory did not amount to
denial of earlier statement or to inconsistent statement), reh 'g denied,
943 F.2d 1315 (5th ed. 1991); United Statesv. Palumbo, 639F.2d 123,
128 n.6 (3d Cir.1981) (because witness's assertion at trial that she could
not remember where she obtained the cocaine "was not necessarily
inconsistent with her prior statement" before grand jury that she had
obtained it from defendant, prior testimony was inadmissible) (emphasis
inoriginal),cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819(1981).

In Fiore, the court of appeals suggested that, on re-trial:
[\]t is not beyond possibility that the Government may
be able to establish that [the witness's] recalcitrance was
due to "the suggestion, procurement or act of the
accused," see Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458,
471-472,20 S. Ct. 993, 998,44 L. Ed. 1150 (1900) in
which event, as recognized in Douglas v. Alabama, supra,
380 U.S. at 420, 85 S. Ct. 1074, a different rule would
apply. If ever there was a case where resort to the
principle of Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552,560,
70 S. Ct. 317, 94 L. Ed. 335 (1950), is appropriate, this
is it.
443 F.2d at 116.
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the position taken in Tyler, is imperative. So, too, is an
open mind to the appropriate use of Maryland Rule 5804(b)(5)' s residual hearsay exception and the possible
adoption ofa rule like new Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(5) regarding wrongdoing that procures the
unavailability ofa witness. The problem ofthe recanting,
intimidated witness will not go away; it threatens
Maryland's criminaljustice system and must be forcefully
addressed.
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